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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Ry. v. White, articulating the standard to be used in assessing what 
constitutes “actionable retaliation” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.1  Before Burlington Northern, the federal appellate courts had 
been splintered on the issue, with at least four different approaches being 
taken among them.  In the wake of Burlington Northern, scholars and 
practitioners initially agreed that the decision was employee favorable.  
The Supreme Court’s standard appeared to allow more retaliation claims 
to be brought by approving claims where an employer took any action 
against an employee that would be “materially adverse to a reasonable 
employee” because of the employee’s protected activity under Title VII.2  
Under this standard, an employee need not prove that there was a tangible 
employment action such as being fired or demoted to bring a retaliation 
claim.3  Instead, the focus was on whether the employer’s conduct was 
materially adverse such that it would have dissuaded a reasonable 
employee from complaining of discrimination.4  More recently, however, 
there has been a sense among scholars that federal courts have applied the 
Burlington Northern standard in an employer-favorable manner, making 
it difficult for retaliation plaintiffs to bring claims.  This Article 
investigates the extent to which these scholarly reactions are accurate.  
Specifically, this Article assesses the rates at which employers have 
prevailed since Burlington Northern. 
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 1. 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 57. 
 3. See id. (holding that “the antiretaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it 
forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace”). 
 4. Id. 
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Using data from three federal courts of appeals, cases were coded 
according to whether the employer prevailed on the issue of whether the 
action taken against the employee satisfied the Burlington Northern 
standard.  On average, employers prevailed in sixty percent of these 
situations.5  However, when results were assessed by circuit, the three 
federal circuits researched had widely divergent results.  This radical split 
among the federal appellate courts in outcomes of these cases, which I 
term a “hidden” circuit split, casts doubt on whether the law is being 
applied consistently throughout the country.  It also raises questions as to 
whether this type of circuit split is present in other legal contexts. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explains the circuit split that 
led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, outlines the 
Burlington Northern decision, and provides an overview of retaliation 
claims after Burlington Northern.  Part II describes the research study.  
Part III details the study’s findings, explores the implications of the 
findings, and analyzes possible reasons for them. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN RETALIATION 
STANDARD 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in 
employment on the basis of “race, sex, color, national origin, or religion.”6  
In addition, it also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees 
who file charges of discrimination or oppose employer discrimination.7  
This antiretaliation provision provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.8 
As the statute indicates, there are two components to the protection against 
employer retaliation: the opposition clause, which protects employees who 
opposed an unlawful employment practice, and the participation clause, 
which protects employees who participate in any proceeding under the 
statute, which includes filing a charge with the Equal Employment 
                                                          
 5. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 7. Id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 8. Id.   
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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).9 
The core concept of the antiretaliation provision is to ensure that 
employees are effectively able to enforce their right to be free from 
discrimination in the workplace.10  If an employee lawfully can be fired 
for complaining of discrimination, the promise of Title VII would be 
hollow, because many, if not all, employees would be unwilling to risk 
termination in order to complain of discrimination.11  In the years leading 
up to Burlington Northern, federal courts struggled to define the scope of 
this protection.  What, specifically, was unlawful retaliation?  Clearly, 
firing an employee was unlawful.12  But what about less severe actions 
such as issuing a negative performance evaluation? 
The EEOC took the position that the antiretaliation provision 
prohibited employers from taking any “adverse employment action” 
against an employee who engaged in protected activity of either opposing 
an unlawful employment practice or participating in a Title VII 
proceeding.  The EEOC defined “adverse employment action” as “any 
adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably 
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected 
activity.”13  The Ninth Circuit approved of this approach, noting that it 
covered “lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and changes in work 
schedules.”14  A substantially similar approach was taken by the Seventh 
Circuit, which allowed retaliation claims if the employer’s actions “would 
have been material to a reasonable employee.”15  As an example of this, 
the Seventh Circuit approved a retaliation claim where the employer 
allegedly removed the employee’s flex-time schedule.16 
However, other federal courts took a more restrictive approach to 
retaliation claims.  The most restrictive approach limited the reach of the 
antiretaliation provision to situations in which the employer took “an 
                                                          
 9. Id.  
 10. Indeed, even retaliation against someone other than the employee who complained of 
discrimination can be protected activity.  See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175–
78 (2011) (allowing claim where alleged retaliation targeted employee’s fiancé). 
 11. As the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern, “The antiretaliation provision seeks to 
secure [Title VII’s] primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) 
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of [Title VII’s] basic guarantees.”  
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the 
antiretaliation provision applies to actions such as hiring, firing, and promoting employees). 
 13. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 8: RETALIATION, ¶ 
8008 (1998).   
 14. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 15. Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 16. Id. at 63.  
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ultimate employment decision,” such as firing or demoting an employee 
who engaged in protected activity.17  A slightly less restrictive approach 
was to limit the scope of the antiretaliation provision to employer actions 
that were “adverse employment actions”—the same language the EEOC 
used—but with a different definition of that term.  Under this approach, 
an employee was protected against retaliation if the retaliatory action had 
an adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.18  
Unlike the EEOC approach, this limited claims to situations where specific 
actions were taken that had a tangible effect on the employee, such as a 
decrease in compensation, or where the employer conduct was harassment 
that was so severe or pervasive that it constituted an abusive working 
environment. 
Given this array of different interpretations of the scope of the 
antiretaliation provision, it was unsurprising that the Supreme Court took 
up the issue.  In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, the Court 
reviewed the different approaches taken by the federal appellate courts 
before determining that the correct approach combined various aspects of 
these approaches.19  In order to be actionable under the antiretaliation 
provision, the Court stated that the retaliation must result in an “injury or 
harm.”20  The Court then defined the required injury as follows: “[A] 
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”21 
The Court identified three key aspects to the standard it announced.  
First, the “materially adverse” portion of the standard was designed to 
draw a distinction between “trivial” employer conduct, which is not 
actionable, and “significant” employer conduct, which is.22  In explaining 
the dividing line between trivial and significant, the Court stated that 
significant actions are “employer actions that are likely ‘to deter victims 
                                                          
 17. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707–08 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Ultimate 
employment decisions include acts such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating.”) (citing Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 18. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865–66 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the 
antiretaliation provision applies to “adverse employment actions” that affect “[t]he essential terms, 
conditions and benefits of the employment”).  This is the same standard that applies to discrimination 
claims under Title VII.  In other words, in order to state a claim under Title VII, the discrimination 
must have affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.  
 19. 548 U.S. 53, 60–61, 67 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 67. 
 21. Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 22. Id. 
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of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,’ the courts, and their 
employers.  And normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple 
lack of good manners will not create such deterrence.”23  The second key 
aspect to the new standard was that it was objective.  Retaliation would 
only be actionable if it would deter a reasonable employee, considered 
from an objective perspective so as to be judicially administrable.24  And 
the third key feature to the standard was that the employer’s conduct had 
to be considered in the circumstances in which it arose, because “the 
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the 
particular circumstances.  Context matters.”25 
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the employer’s argument 
that the standard for actionable retaliation should be the same as the 
standard for actionable discrimination.  Under established Title VII 
doctrine, a discrimination claim could only be brought where there was an 
adverse action taken by an employer.26  The Court focused on the 
differences in the language between Title VII’s substantive anti-
discrimination language and antiretaliation language as well as the need 
for a broader reach of the antiretaliation standard  to ensure the 
effectiveness of the anti-discrimination provision.27 
The initial reaction to the Burlington Northern standard was that the 
decision was employee favorable;28 specifically, the new standard was 
seen as opening the door to more retaliation claims because of the lower 
standard for bringing such claims.29  And there was indeed a surge of 
retaliation claims after Burlington Northern.  From 2001 to 2006, leading 
up to Burlington Northern, the number of retaliation claims, called 
“charges,” that were filed with the EEOC remained essentially flat, at 
approximately 22,000 each year.30  Since 2006, retaliation charges have 
                                                          
 23. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).  
 24. Id. at 68–69.   
 25. Id. at 69. 
 26. Different standards apply to harassment claims, but even there, there is a similar requirement 
that the harassment be so severe or pervasive that it affects the terms and conditions of employment.  
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“[T]he very fact that the discriminatory 
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because 
of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”). 
 27. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67–69.  
 28. See, e.g., Christopher J. Eckhart, Note, Employers Beware: Burlington Northern v. White and 
the New Title VII Anti-Retaliation Standard, 41 IND. L. REV. 479, 479–80 (2008).  
 29. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 907 (2008) (noting that “[e]arly commentary on Burlington Northern 
generally construed it as pro-plaintiff”); Lindsay Roshkind, Comment, Employment Law: An Adverse 
Action Against Employers: The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 
59 FLA. L. REV. 707, 715 (2007) (calling the decision “an enormous victory” for employees).  
 30. See Retaliation Based Charges (Charges Filed With EEOC) FY 1997–2018, U.S. EQUAL 
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increased nearly every year.  In absolute numbers, between 2006 and 2007, 
the total number of charges increased by approximately 4,000.31  In 2008, 
the number of retaliation charges increased again, by 6,000.32  The 
increases slowed in 2009 and 2010, with approximately 4,000 more 
charges being brought in those years combined.33  The increase in number 
of charges also led to an increase in the percentage of all charges filed that 
included a retaliation component.  In 2006, 29.8% of all charges included  
retaliation charges.34  By 2017, 48.8% of all charges included a retaliation 
charge.35 
However, the initial sense of an employee victory in the new standard 
quickly faded.  In 2008, Professors Deborah Brake and Johanna Grossman 
argued that lower courts were interpreting Burlington Northern in a 
manner that made it difficult for plaintiffs to establish a retaliation claim, 
in part because “lower courts expect the reasonable employee to endure a 
substantial degree of adversity for the sake of challenging 
discrimination.”36  Others also noted problems after Burlington Northern 
as it became evident that the lower courts were struggling to apply the new 
standard.37 
More recently, Professor Sandra Sperino critiqued the lower courts’ 
application of the Burlington Northern standard, arguing that a survey she 
conducted of students’ perspectives on what employer conduct would 
dissuade them from complaining of discrimination indicates that lower 
courts reach inaccurate factual determinations as to whether employer 
conduct would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining of 
discrimination.38  Specifically, students found that many employer 
                                                          
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm  
[https://perma.cc/2P4Y-5WHX] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Charge Statistics (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/85JG-HXNC] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).   
 35. Id. 
 36. Brake & Grossman, supra note 29, at 908.  
 37. J. Gregory Grisham & Frank L. Day, Title VII Retaliation Claims After White: The Struggle 
to Define Materially Adverse Conduct in the Context of the Reasonable Employee Standard, 10 
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 80, 83 (2009) (surveying decisions post-White and 
finding that “these post-White decisions demonstrate that the ‘objective standard’ adopted by the 
Supreme Court is not nearly as objective and easy to apply as the Court appeared to suggest it would 
be”). 
 38. Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2052 
(2015) (“The most important insight [of her research] relates to the accuracy of the lower courts’ 
factual determinations that negative consequences, such as threatened termination or negative 
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responses to employees reporting discrimination that courts had held were 
insufficient to state a retaliation claim would in fact deter the students from 
reporting discrimination.  In discussing the standard, Professor Sperino 
noted: 
In case after case, appellate courts determine that a certain action does 
not constitute an adverse action without mentioning any of the individual 
circumstances of the plaintiff or his workplace.  While purporting to 
apply Burlington, courts also ignore a significant portion of the opinion 
and consequently are not following the applicable law.39 
However, none of these scholars or critiques conducted any empirical 
assessment of federal court decisions. 
II. THE RESEARCH STUDY 
This research project was undertaken to provide empirical information 
on the application of the Burlington Northern standard in the federal courts 
of appeals. 
A. Scope of the Research 
For this study, federal court of appeals decisions available on Westlaw 
were used.  District court cases were not considered because of the 
potential for reversal of decisions and the concomitant difficulty in 
determining the outcomes of those cases.  In addition, federal appellate 
court decisions are generally more carefully analyzed and written because 
of the smaller caseload of the judges.  This smaller caseload and more 
careful consideration also make the opinions more valuable for analyzing 
the basis for the decision.  The cases are also easier for research assistants 
to read and code outcomes because they tend to be well organized.  
Furthermore, federal appellate court decisions provided a more 
manageable number of cases to review. 
In the time since the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern, 
there have been a total of 993 opinions40 issued by federal courts of appeals 
that have cited Burlington Northern.41  Of these, 319 are reported 
                                                          
evaluations, would not dissuade reasonable people from complaining.  These determinations are likely 
incorrect.”). 
 39. Id. at 2060–61. 
 40. The opinions used for this research were obtained on May 22, 2018.  Obviously, this number 
will increase over time. 
 41. This research considered cases from the First through Eleventh Circuits.  No cases from 
specialized federal appellate courts were considered because they have different jurisdictional 
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decisions.  The sheer number of total cases made it infeasible to review all 
the opinions.  While a sample from across all federal circuits was one 
possibility, this study instead focused on three federal circuits: the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.  These circuits were selected because they had 
manageable numbers of opinions: fifty-one in the Fourth Circuit, forty-
five in the Eighth Circuit, and seventy-four in the Tenth Circuit.42  In 
addition, it seemed plausible that different circuits might be applying the 
law differently, perhaps to reach results in alignment with their circuit’s 
approach before Burlington Northern.  Therefore, reviewing all cases from 
several circuits presented opportunities to uncover more information than 
a sample out of all the circuits.  On the other hand, the downside of 
considering three circuits rather than a broader sample was the potential 
for the cases in the three circuits to be non-representative of the larger pool 
of cases across all of the circuits.  However, this presented less of a concern 
because there were a significant number of individual cases within each of 
the circuits and it seemed unlikely that they would be substantially 
different than a sample drawn from all available decisions. 
Three research assistants were hired to code the decisions.  Each 
research assistant received identical written instructions for reading and 
coding the decisions.43  The research assistants were told to use Westlaw 
to locate Burlington Northern and read it.  After they read it, they wrote a 
brief explanation of the case which was reviewed for accuracy.  There 
were then two sets of coding tests.  An initial test was done of two cases.  
For each case, the research assistants were told to read the synopsis of the 
case provided by Westlaw as well as the portion(s) of the case which 
involved Burlington Northern.  The students then coded the case as 
follows.  First, students categorized the case as either addressing the issue 
of whether the employer’s conduct was sufficient to support a retaliation 
claim or not addressing that issue.44  Second, for cases that addressed 
whether the employer’s conduct would support a retaliation claim, 
research assistants determined whether the employer prevailed on that 
                                                          
requirements––an additional consideration that had the potential to affect results.  Further, the Westlaw 
research platform was used for this research.  The number of opinions was obtained by pulling up 
Burlington Northern using its official citation, clicking on the “Citing References” tab, and clicking 
on the “Cases” link on the left side of the screen.  Under the heading “Jurisdiction” on the left side of 
the screen, the “Federal” option was expanded, then “Courts of Appeals.”  This then displayed the 
total number of cases for each federal court of appeals.  
 42. While the First Circuit also has a manageable number of decisions, it has few cases and issues 
reported decisions in nearly all of them, raising concerns about whether it would be an outlier circuit.   
 43. The written instructions are available from the author upon request. 
 44. Even though all the cases in the study cited Burlington Northern, some of them referenced it 
for other issues such as whether retaliation directed at a third party, not the employee who complained 
of discrimination, would be actionable.   
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issue.45 
All three students coded the two initial test cases identically and 
consistently with how I coded them.  However, when the research 
assistants began coding cases for the study, it became apparent that there 
were inconsistencies in coding.  For this reason, I held an in-depth session 
in which I walked the students through several difficult cases and 
explained the analyses of them.  Following this session, we developed a 
protocol by which any student who was unsure of how to code a case 
would immediately email me with their question.  I would circulate the 
question and my answer to all research assistants to ensure consistency. 
As noted above, each case in the study was coded initially by two 
research assistants.  If both research assistants agreed on the coding of a 
decision, then that was the coding that was used in the study’s analysis.  If 
they disagreed on the coding, the case was assigned to a third research 
assistant for coding.46  In nearly all the cases where this occurred, the third 
research assistant’s coding matched the coding of one of the two previous 
research assistants, and that majority decision was then used as the final 
coding.  There were a few cases in which all three research assistants coded 
the cases differently; these cases I reviewed and coded myself. 
B. Hypotheses 
Previous research on outcomes in employment discrimination cases 
indicates that employers prevail at higher rates in these cases than in other 
civil claims.47  In one study, researchers found that employees prevailed 
in claims brought under Title VII at a rate of 10.88%.48  Similarly, in 
                                                          
 45. The spreadsheet that the research assistants filled out required them to select either “Employer 
prevailed” or “Employer did not prevail.”  For most of these cases, there is no way of determining 
whether the employee ultimately prevailed on this issue because the bulk of the reported decisions 
reviewed a lower court determination either on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment 
that the employer’s conduct, as a matter of law, was insufficient to support a retaliation claim.  If the 
employer did not win at the appellate level on that issue, the case was remanded to the lower court for 
further proceedings.  However, because the vast majority of civil claims are settled, there is no court 
determination on the Burlington Northern issue in favor of the employee.  Thus, coding the cases to 
choose between “Employer prevailed” and “Employee prevailed” would be misleading and potentially 
inaccurate. 
 46. For the Tenth Circuit, the two initial research assistants coded  sixty-two out of seventy-four 
decisions the same.  For the Fourth Circuit, forty-eight out of fifty-one were coded the same, and for 
the Eighth Circuit, the two initial research assistants coded thirty-four out of forty-five decisions the 
same.   
 47. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (analyzing employment 
discrimination claims in comparison to other civil claims brought in federal court). 
 48. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal 
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 117 (2009) (data found in Display 6: 
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retaliation cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, one 
study found that employers prevailed at a 75% rate.49  Based on this, it 
seemed likely that employers would prevail at high rates on the Burlington 
Northern issue.  This potential outcome was buttressed also by the 
research on outcomes in whistleblowing cases, in which employers prevail 
at a high rate.50  Employment discrimination claims bear a number of 
similarities to whistleblowing cases.  The core commonality in both cases 
is that an employee is alleging that the employer is violating a law and that 
when the employee raised concerns about such violations, the employer 
retaliated against the employee.  Thus, given that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs win at low rates, and whistleblowing plaintiffs 
win at low rates, it seemed likely that in an employment discrimination 
retaliation situation, the employee would not prevail often. 
However, a competing consideration was the fact that the standard for 
what is actionable under Burlington Northern is broader than for 
discrimination claims, allowing more retaliation claims to be brought than 
discrimination claims.  This suggested that retaliation plaintiffs would 
succeed at higher rates than if they were alleging discrimination.  On the 
other hand, given the sense, discussed above, that lower courts are 
applying Burlington Northern in an employer-favorable manner, perhaps 
the broader standard would not result in greater plaintiff success rates.  Or, 
perhaps, the initial reaction to the broader standard was with plaintiff 
success, but that rate declined over time.  In short, it was far from clear 
how plaintiffs would fare on the Burlington Northern issue. 
Furthermore, there is potential for the outcomes in reported cases to 
be different from unreported cases.  According to one study, 
approximately one-third of employment discrimination decisions are 
unreported.51  Scholars have suggested that unreported decisions are issued 
where the law is “settled and straightforward.”52  This suggests that 
                                                          
Numbers and Win Rates, Employment Discrimination Cases by Type, Fiscal 1998-2006, U.S. District 
Courts). 
 49. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEV. L.J. 823, 836 (2019). 
 50. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 66 (2007) (finding that “during [the] first 
three years [Sarbanes-Oxley was in force], only 3.6% of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief 
through the initial administrative process that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% of 
whistleblowers won appeals through the process”). 
 51. See Lee Reeves, Pragmatism Over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment 
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 492 (2008) (summarizing findings based on 
various Westlaw searches).  The author also notes that in the Westlaw research conducted, the searches 
did not yield mutually exclusive categories, and therefore the total number of cases found is likely 
overstated. 
 52. Id. (discussing Cass Sunstein’s research on employment discrimination cases and indicating 
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reported cases would involve more complex legal scenarios, which in turn 
might lead to statistically different outcomes. 
II. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, employers prevailed at a 60% rate in retaliation cases on the 
issue of whether the alleged actions taken against an employee are 
actionable under Burlington Northern.53  A second significant finding of 
this study is that there was a vast difference between the circuits at the 
rates at which employers prevailed, which raises questions about the 
consistency of federal appellate court decisions applying Burlington 
Northern.54  The third finding of this study is that within each circuit, 
employers were more likely to prevail in unreported cases than in reported 
cases.55  Research results are discussed in detail below. 
A. Data 
1. Combined Results and Overview of the Circuit Split 
Table 1 shows the combined results of all the circuits.  On average, 
combining all three circuits, employers prevail at a rate of 60% on the issue 
of whether an employee has suffered a materially adverse employment 
action sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Burlington Northern.  
Overall, employers are successful on this retaliation issue less often than 
in employment discrimination cases, retaliation cases under the American 
with Disabilities Act, or in whistleblowing cases.56  When considering the 
combined circuits, there is only a tiny difference between the rate of 
success for employers in unreported decisions and reported decisions, with 
employers prevailing in 1% more of the unreported cases than the reported 
cases. 
  
                                                          
that the author agrees with Sunstein on this point). 
 53. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra Section II.B (discussing outcomes in these cases).  
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What is particularly fascinating is the incredible variability of the 
employer success rates in the circuits.  Employers in the Eighth Circuit are 
more likely to prevail on this issue than in either other circuit.  The 
difference between the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit is particularly 
large, with the employer being more than twice as likely to prevail in the 
Eighth Circuit than in the Fourth Circuit. 
While the overall number of cases coded was large enough for 
statistical significance, breaking down the data by circuit produces only 
three data points (one for each circuit).  This makes testing for statistical 
significance at the circuit level impossible, because the sample size (n=3) 
is so small.  However, it is still worth considering the deviations of each 
circuit from the overall average. 
The outcomes in all three circuits were consistent on one point.  
Employers are more likely to succeed on the Burlington Northern issue in 
unreported cases than in reported cases within each circuit.  For the Fourth 
Circuit, there was a 43% success rate in unreported cases versus 14% in 
reported cases.  In the Eighth Circuit, employers had a 100% success rate 
in unreported cases, as opposed to a 77% success rate in reported cases.  
And in the Tenth Circuit, employers had a 75% success rate in unreported 
cases, as contrasted with 50% in reported cases. 
The results of the study for each circuit are discussed below. 
2. Fourth Circuit 
In the Fourth Circuit, there were a total of fifty-one decisions that cited 
to Burlington Northern.  Thirty-five were unreported decisions, and 
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sixteen were reported.  Out of the fifty-one total decisions, thirty (59%) 
addressed the question of whether the employer’s conduct was sufficient 
for the plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim.  Table 2 shows the outcomes 
in cases where the court addressed the question of whether the employer’s 
conduct was sufficient for the plaintiff to bring a viable retaliation claim.  
Using the expected 60% rate at which employers prevailed in all cases, we 
would expect to find eighteen cases in which the employer prevailed.  
Instead, employers prevailed in eleven cases, or 37%. 
Breaking the cases down into unreported and reported decisions is of 
somewhat limited value in the Fourth Circuit because of the small number 
of reported decisions.  The Fourth Circuit had a total of seven reported 
cases in which the court addressed the Burlington Northern issue.57  If 
employers prevailed in the Fourth Circuit at the rate they prevailed across 
all reported cases, the expected number of cases in which the employer 
would prevail would be 4.2 cases.  In reality, the employer prevailed in 
only one reported case, or 14%, in the Fourth Circuit.58  However, this is 
a small sample size, and this differential should therefore be considered 
with that limitation in mind.  As for unreported cases, if employers 
prevailed in the Fourth Circuit at the rate at which they prevailed across 
all unreported cases, employers would be expected to prevail in 13.6 cases.  
In reality, employers in the Fourth Circuit prevailed in ten unreported 
cases, for a success rate of 43%.59 
 
  
                                                          
 57. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 341–43 (4th Cir. 2008); Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 
650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 283–84 (4th 
Cir. 2015); Adams v. Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Sch., 789 F.3d 422, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2015); DeMasters 
v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2015); Smith v. Clark/Smoot/Russell, 796 F.3d 424, 
434 (4th Cir. 2015); S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cty., 819 F.3d 69, 78 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 58. Adams, 789 F.3d at 424. 
 59. Csicsmann v. Sallada, 211 F. App’x 163, 164 (4th Cir. 2006); Parsons v. Wynne, 221 F. 
App’x 197, 198 (4th Cir. 2007); Pueschel v. Peters, 340 F. App’x 858, 859 (4th Cir. 2009); Scurlock-
Ferguson v. City of Durham, 381 F. App’x 302, 302 (4th Cir. 2010); Mascone v. Am. Physical Soc’y, 
Inc., 404 F. App’x 762, 763 (4th Cir. 2010); Jensen-Graf v. Chesapeake Emp’rs Ins. Co., 616 F. App’x 
596, 597 (4th Cir. 2015); Wilson v. Gaston Cty., N.C., 685 F. App’x 193, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2017); 
McKinney v. G4S Gov’t Sols., Inc., 711 F. App’x 130, 132 (4th Cir. 2017); Cooper v. Smithfield 
Packing Co., 724 F. App’x 197, 199 (4th Cir. 2018); Sanders v. Tikras Tech. Sols. Corp., 725 F. App’x 
228, 229 (4th Cir. 2018). 
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TABLE 2: FOURTH CIRCUIT EMPLOYER SUCCESS RATES 
 Employer Prevailed 
 











3. Eighth Circuit 
In the Eighth Circuit, there were twenty-eight cases out of the initial 
data set of 45 cases that addressed whether the employer’s behavior was 
sufficient to support a retaliation claim.  Employers prevailed on this issue 
in 22 of these 28 cases.  The Eighth Circuit percentage results, shown in 
Table 3, are a stark contrast to the Fourth Circuit results.  In the Eighth 
Circuit, employers prevailed in all of the unreported cases.  However, there 
were only 2 unreported cases in which the Burlington Northern issue was 
addressed.60  Using the 60% average rate, we would expect to find 1.2 
cases in which the employer prevailed, as compared to the actual result of 
2 cases.  The fact that the employer prevailed in both of the unreported 
cases may be insignificant because of the extremely small sample size of 
reported decisions that actually addressed the Burlington Northern issue 
in the Eighth Circuit.  What is of more value is considering the combined 
result of the reported and unreported cases in which employers prevailed 
in the Eighth Circuit.  Using the overall rate at which employers prevailed 
(60%), we would expect to find employers prevailing in 16.8 out of the 
total 28 cases.  However, employers actually prevailed in 22 of the cases, 
which represents a 79% success rate.61  In short, in the Eighth Circuit, 
                                                          
 60. Cano v. Geithner, 354 F. App’x 283, 284 (8th Cir. 2009); Duren v. URS Corp., 676 F. App’x 
620, 621 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 61. Cano, 354 F. App’x at 284; Duren, 676 F. App’x at 620; Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 
581 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2007); Vajdl v. Mesabi Acad. 
of Kids Peace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2007); Devin v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 491 F.3d 
778, 781 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2007); Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 
710, 713 (8th Cir. 2007); Brannum v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 544–45 (8th Cir. 2008); Recio 
v. Creighton Univ., 521 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Forrest City Sch. Dist., 524 F.3d 879, 
880–81 (8th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 548 F.3d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 2008); 
Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2009); Sutherland v. Mo. Dep’t of 
Corr., 580 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 2009); Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954, 956 (8th 
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employers are winning an unexpected number of cases on the Burlington 
Northern issue. 
TABLE 3: EIGHTH CIRCUIT EMPLOYER SUCCESS RATES 
 Employer Prevailed 
 










4. Tenth Circuit 
In the Tenth Circuit, there were a total of seventy-four decisions that 
cited to Burlington Northern.  Thirty-nine of these were unreported cases 
and thirty-six were reported.  The seventy-four decisions were divided 
nearly evenly between those that addressed the Burlington Northern issue 
and those that did not, with thirty-six decisions addressing the issue and 
thirty-eight not addressing it.  Table 4 shows the outcomes in cases where 
the court addressed the question of whether the employer’s conduct was 
sufficient for the plaintiff to have a viable retaliation claim. 
The employer success rate in the Tenth Circuit for combined cases, 
64%, is very close to the 60% average success rate in the study.  
Interestingly, the success rates diverge for reported and unreported cases, 
with employers prevailing at a much higher rate (75%) in unreported 
decisions than in reported decisions (50%). 
 
TABLE 4: TENTH CIRCUIT EMPLOYER SUCCESS RATES 










                                                          
Cir. 2010); Burkhart v. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 473 (8th Cir. 2010); Fercello v. Cty. 
of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 2010); Fanning v. Potter, 614 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2011); Quinn v. St. Louis Cty., 653 F.3d 745, 
748 (8th Cir. 2011); Hill v. City of Pine Bluff, Ark., 696 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2012); AuBuchon v. 
Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 640 (8th Cir. 2014).   
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B. Implications 
The three most significant findings were: (1) the overall rate of 
employer success; (2) the circuit split on employer success rates; and (3) 
the difference within each circuit between outcomes on reported versus 
unreported cases.  The implications of each finding, as well as potential 
reasons for it, are discussed below.  In discussing each finding and its 
implications, the goal is to begin a discussion, not reach ultimate 
conclusions.62 
1. Overall Rate of Employer Success 
The overall success rate of employers, 60%, could be understood to 
suggest that scholars are correct who have opined that the federal courts 
are applying Burlington Northern in a pro-employer manner.63  However, 
employers are prevailing at a far lower rate on this retaliation issue than 
overall in employment discrimination cases, where their success rate is 
nearly 90%.64  Thus, the study’s finding on this point could be read to 
indicate that courts are less hostile to retaliation cases than employment 
discrimination cases.  Alternatively, it might suggest that the narrow 
Burlington Northern issue is somewhat immune from the overall judicial 
hostility to employment discrimination claims. 
A third possibility is that the initial scholarly reaction to Burlington 
Northern was accurate—that, in fact, the standard is employee favorable, 
as shown by the better results for plaintiffs on this issue than in 
employment discrimination cases in general.65  Bolstering this possibility 
                                                          
 62. The work of Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer in their article, Empiricism, 
Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 156 (2014), greatly influenced the 
structure of this section of this Article.  I have attempted to write this section in keeping with their 
comment that “[f]actual inquiry is essential to producing meaningful critiques of existing practice, 
discovering new forms of legal interaction with political and social dynamics, and assessing basic 
normative claims.”  Id.  This Article’s goal is to do this with “due humility for methodological 
fallibility” while remaining “wary of broad claims.”  Id. at 146. 
 63. This study did not assess the accuracy of the federal court decisions.  It is possible that the 
facts of the cases were such that the courts were clearly correct in the 60% of cases that they decided 
in favor of the employer.  This would mean that the courts are not pro-employer.  The inability to 
determine what the correct outcome of the cases in any data set would be is part of what makes 
analyzing success rates difficult.   
 64. The information on outcomes in whistleblowing cases is not as comprehensive, but in the 
administrative process, employers prevail in the investigative process at rates above 95%.  See Richard 
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) 
(finding that in the period studied, employees won less than 2% of Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration cases). 
 65. There did not appear to be much, if any, change in the outcomes of cases over time, at least 
in the Fourth Circuit, as discussed below. 
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is the fact that employers usually succeed at higher rates on appeal in 
employment discrimination claims than plaintiffs do.66  Employers win in 
the vast majority of cases at the trial court level.67  When plaintiffs appeal, 
the employer prevails at an 80% rate at the appellate level, which is higher 
than the 60% average success rate for employers in this study.68 
Finally, it is also plausible that the relatively low success rate for 
employers in this study is misleading.  In two of the circuits studied, the 
employer success rate in this study was significantly closer to the success 
rates of employers in employment discrimination cases in general.  
Perhaps the best explanation for the relatively low employer success rate 
overall is the circuit split in outcomes, discussed below.  If this is correct, 
then the most significant aspect to this research is the circuit split it 
revealed. 
2. Circuit Split on Employer Success Rates 
The second significant finding of the research was the circuit split it 
revealed.  This finding is disturbing.  Burlington Northern was a case taken 
by the Supreme Court to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals 
in retaliation claims.  And while Burlington Northern did resolve the split 
as to the legal standard, in its wake, the data shows that a new type of 
circuit split has emerged: a circuit split of results, not standards.  Using the 
same legal standard, the federal circuits are reaching dramatically different 
outcomes. 
 There are two things that make this new type of circuit split 
particularly troubling: (1) that it is hidden; and (2) the potential implication 
of injustice.  As for the first implication, before this research study, there 
was no way to know that the outcomes in cases in different federal circuits 
were so varied.  The circuit split illuminated by this research was hidden 
because there is no database that collects statistical information on the 
substantive court rulings made in each case.69  Before this research study, 
there was no way to effectively engage in questions about why federal 
circuits’ decisions might vary so greatly in retaliation claims. 
The research results raise the very troubling question of the extent to 
                                                          
 66. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 48, at 111 (finding that courts reverse plaintiffs’ wins at the 
trial court level “far more often than defendants’ wins [at the trial court level]”). 
 67. Id. at 117 (demonstrating in Display 6 that from 1998–2006, plaintiffs’ win rate was 10.88% 
in Title VII cases in federal district court). 
 68. Id. (showing in Display 2 verdicts that result in the employer prevailing are only overturned 
on appeal 8.72% of the time).  
 69. Information is collected on outcomes of civil cases; thus, it is possible to identify rates of 
success for plaintiffs in civil cases.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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which this type of circuit split—a split in the circuits on outcomes, not 
standards—exists in other contexts.  How many more of these hidden 
circuit splits are present today?  Furthermore, because of the manner in 
which judicial opinions are used in subsequent cases as binding authority, 
the outcomes are reinforced within that circuit.  As noted by Professor 
Sperino, once a court determines that a particular employer’s action is not 
actionable in a retaliation claim, there is a tendency of courts in subsequent 
cases to reach the same outcome in any case involving that type of 
employer action.70  At heart, this behavior is driven by one key component 
of judicial decision making: fear of reversal.71 
The second disturbing aspect to the hidden circuit split revealed in this 
study is that it has the potential to undermine the appearance of justice and 
impartiality in judicial decision making.  “Equal Justice Under Law,” the 
phrase carved into the Supreme Court building, suggests not only equality 
of opportunity to be heard, but equality in the application of the uniform 
legal standard that Burlington Northern represents.  Taken to its logical 
extreme, it raises difficult questions about the legitimacy of judicial 
decisions.  The results of this research study suggest that while there is 
formal equality in retaliation cases, as represented by the articulation of 
the legal standard, there may not be substantive equality, as represented 
by the divergent outcomes in the application of the legal standard. 
The divergence between common standards and outcomes is related 
to new legal realism’s inquiry into “when and how formal law matters.”72  
As one proponent of new legal realism stated, new legal realism avoids the 
reductivism of earlier legal realism, seeking instead “to explain the 
‘conditions’ under which [formal] law does or does not matter in various 
public arenas, such as the . . . courts.”73  If formal law matters, the 
outcomes in the Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit should not be 
diametrically opposed, unless the facts of cases brought in the Fourth 
Circuit and Eighth Circuit are essentially the opposite.74 
                                                          
 70. See Sperino, supra note 38, at 2057 (discussing this phenomenon and labeling it “perceived 
precedent”). 
 71. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: 
Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203, 210 (2017) (noting mixed outcomes 
but that some “studies support the conclusion that avoiding reversal matters to judges”). 
 72. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 62, at 145. 
 73. Id. 
 74. While one could expect that different federal circuits might vary in the results they reach 
simply by virtue of the different facts of the cases, the split between the Fourth and Eighth Circuits is 
particularly wide.  It is possible that if all the circuits were coded, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits could 
be the outliers—i.e. the trailing ends of the bell curve—and that the study included the two most widely 
divergent circuits by chance. 
2019 A NEW TYPE OF CIRCUIT SPLIT 155 
Of course, this is not to suggest that the outcomes of all cases 
involving the Burlington Northern issue should be resolved the same.  Nor 
is it to suggest that even in similar factual scenarios, the same outcome 
should be reached.  As Professor Jessie Allen stated, discussing new legal 
realism, outcomes in cases are not determined “mechanically, without the 
involvement of some subjective judgment from the decision maker.”75  
Professor Allen takes this one step further, arguing that it is impossible to 
test the determinacy of legal doctrine on outcomes in cases.  Specifically, 
Professor Allen states that, even if we could observe the mental process 
by which a decision in a case is reached, “we would not be able to confirm 
that the legal outcomes in those minds were the result of doctrinal 
determinacy.”76 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Allen, the results of 
this research are troubling because of the possibility that doctrine, far from 
being determinate, is in fact irrelevant to outcome.  If doctrine plays a role 
in determining outcomes, one would anticipate that results in circuits 
would tend to converge.  While it is expected that there will be variability 
in outcomes, just as there is indeterminacy in the applicable legal standard, 
it is surprising to see the degree of difference in the outcomes reached in 
the various circuits. 
This variability has previously been uncovered in other contexts.  
Variability in judicial decision making has been found in contexts such as 
in criminal convictions and whether to grant bonds.77  Research on 
immigration asylum cases has shown wide variation among immigration 
judges, with some granting asylum at a much higher rate than other 
judges.78  Applying this to the current context, it may be that panel 
participants vote in similar ways across cases, with the result that a few 
judges could be driving the results in each circuit.  The circuit level 
variation in this study was similar to the variations that also occurred at 
the immigration court level, resulting in asylum seekers’ chances of 
success varying widely between courts in different locations.79 
Another way of articulating the troubling nature of the results in this 
                                                          
 75. Jessie Allen, Empirical Doctrine, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10 (2015). 
 76. Id. at 30. 
 77. See Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 71, at 204 (surveying research on variability in 
outcomes and opining that “judicial decisions are too chaotic”). 
 78. Some judges’ rates of granting asylum deviated more than 50% from the national average.  
See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 295, 333 (2007). 
 79. One example of this was with Chinese asylum seekers: “[A] Chinese asylum seeker unlucky 
enough to have her case heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on 
her asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.”  Id. at 329.  
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study is to say it indicates a lack of predictability in general.80  If the Fourth 
Circuit and Eighth Circuit’s outcomes are so variable, attorneys are less 
able to predict their future success in retaliation cases.  And at the same 
time, the circuit split raises the troubling hypothesis that doctrine does not 
matter. 
 Because of the concerns raised above, the results beg for some 
rational explanation.  Why are judges in the Fourth Circuit and Eighth 
Circuit reaching different outcomes?  There are multiple bodies of 
research, running the gamut from psychological to political forces, that 
focus on identifying factors relating to judicial behavior.81  Numerous 
researchers have identified a link between judicial behavior and political 
ideology.82  For example, one study found that Democrat-appointed judges 
are more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs than Republican-appointed 
judges.83  On the other hand, there have been inevitable critiques of this 
body of research, and at least one research study found that political 
ideology had “only a modest influence” on judicial decision making.84  
The possibility of political ideology affecting outcomes in these cases is 
assessed below. 
Another factor identified in previous research is geography.  In the 
immigration asylum context, one research study found wide variation 
among outcomes in different circuits.85  The researchers considered 
political ideology briefly as a rationale, but went on to suggest that 
regional culture was a factor, noting that the circuits most hostile to asylum 
seekers were all in the South.86  In that study, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
occupied the middle tier of circuits in terms of the outcomes in asylum 
cases, being neither as hostile as the “Southern” circuits, nor as welcoming 
as circuits such as the Seventh, which was most receptive to asylum 
                                                          
 80. As Professor Allen states, “a lack of predictability in legal outcomes creates its own 
legitimacy problems.  Among other things, unpredictable law enforcement punishes people who had 
no way to conform their behavior to avoid losses.”  Allen, supra note 75, at 45. 
 81. Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2017, 2023–30 (2016) (discussing the wide variety of research into judicial behavior). 
 82. See id. at 2041–43 (concluding that several researchers found support for the argument that 
ideology influences judicial decision making).  
 83. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2096 (2017) (“Democrats favored the plaintiffs more than Republicans did.  
None of the scenarios demonstrated a significant effect of political attitude on awards, although one 
yielded a marginally significant effect.  Aggregating across all of the six scenarios suggests a modest 
effect.”).  
 84. See id. at 2054–56 (discussing the limits of the existing research and noting that “[o]ur results 
suggest that politics has only a modest influence on trial judges”). 
 85. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 363–64. 
 86. Id. 
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claims.87  The value of geography as an explanatory factor in my research 
study seems questionable.  One can envision reasons why Southern 
circuits would have more hostility to immigrants than Northern circuits.88  
However, it is difficult to conceive of similar geographic variation as to 
retaliation claims. 
Other explanations might focus on demographic characteristics of 
judges.  Social science researchers have focused on demographic 
characteristics of judges to explain divergence in case outcomes.89  There 
is some research suggesting that judges vote in a way that benefits 
demographic groups to which they belong.90  This includes characteristics 
of race and gender.91  The correlation between outcomes in retaliation 
cases and these two demographic characteristics are discussed below. 
Life experience can also affect outcomes in cases.  For example, in the 
immigration research study referenced above, researchers considered a 
wide variety of judges’ demographic characteristics as variables that could 
affect rates of granting asylum.  Prior work experience had an effect on 
these rates.  For example, a judge with a law enforcement background was 
linked to a lower rate of granting asylum, while those with nonprofit 
backgrounds were linked to higher rates.92  In terms of demographic 
characteristics, it seemed unlikely that there would be a work experience 
characteristic that would play out in the retaliation context the way it 
would in the immigration context, but even if it did, obtaining that type of 
information was beyond the capacity of this research. 
 In sum, it seemed plausible that a few readily obtainable 
characteristics of federal judges might help explain the outcomes in these 
cases.  Political affiliation, race, and sex are discussed below.  In addition, 
several other possible explanations for the circuit split were evident.  First, 
the outcomes might be consistent with each circuit’s approach prior to 
Burlington Northern.  That is, the circuit split that existed before 
Burlington Northern might have simply replicated itself after Burlington 
Northern in the outcomes of the cases rather than the legal standard.  
Second, the circuit split might reflect each circuit’s hostility to 
employment discrimination plaintiffs in general.  Third, the fact that the 
Fourth Circuit contains so many federal employees might be a contributing 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 366.  
 88. The long history of legal segregation and codified racism cannot be ignored in this context.   
 89. See generally Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 71 (describing research that evaluates 
demographic characteristics of judges that affect their rulings). 
 90. Id. at 206–09.   
 91. Id. at 207–08.  
 92. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 345–47 (discussing the role of a judge’s background 
in immigration enforcement). 
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factor to its outcomes.  Each one of these possibilities is addressed below. 
a. The Circuit Split and Political Affiliation of Judges 
As noted above, one possible explanation for the circuit split is that 
the difference in the circuit outcomes are driven by the political affiliations 
of the judges within each circuit.  There is a body of research indicating 
that political affiliation is correlated with outcomes in politically-charged 
settings.93  With respect to employment discrimination cases, one study of 
success rates found that, “[w]hen a Republican-appointed judge gave the 
decision, plaintiffs won 30.8% of the time, and when a Democrat-
appointed judge gave the decision, plaintiffs won 38.6% of the time.”94  
This research might help explain the differences between the circuits 
depending on the composition of each circuit during the timeframe from 
2006–2018.95  On the other hand, research conducted of immigration 
asylum cases found no statistically significant correlation between 
political affiliation of judges and outcomes in one federal circuit, but did 
find a correlation in another.96  In the context of the Voting Rights Act, 
one study found that outcomes of cases were correlated to political 
affiliation of the judges sitting on the panel.97 
As with all circuits, the composition of the Fourth Circuit from 2006–
2018, which was the timeframe involved in this study, was split between 
Democrat-appointed and Republican-appointed judges.  If all judges who 
were active, including Senior Judges, at any time during that interval are 
considered, there were twelve Democrat-appointed judges (48%) and 
                                                          
 93. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 838 
(2008) (“In many areas of law, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes more often than Republican 
appointees do, whatever the partisan configuration of the panel.”). 
 94. John Friedl & Andre Honoree, Is Justice Blind? Examining the Relationship Between 
Presidential Appointments of Judges and Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 CUMB. 
L. REV. 89, 97 (2008). 
 95. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/TZ55-7P9D] (enter judge’s name into search 
box) (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Biographical Directory] (providing information on 
judicial composition of the federal circuit courts).  In order to obtain information on the period in 
question, searches were run to identify judges who have been appointed since 1964.  Judges who 
retired, resigned, or died before 2006, and those appointed after the closing date of this study (May 
2018), were eliminated from the list.  All remaining judges were coded by the party of the appointing 
president.  
 96. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 369–71 (finding no correlation in the Third Circuit 
but finding a correlation in the Sixth Circuit). 
 97. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2008) (“Democratic appointees are significantly more likely than Republican appointees to cast votes 
in favor of the plaintiff under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”). 
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thirteen Republican-appointed judges (52%)––a nearly even split.98  
However, these figures include judges who were on senior status and also 
some who resigned, retired, or died during the interval.99  Removing these 
individuals from the pool of judges results in eight Democrat-appointed 
judges (62%) and five Republican-appointed judges (38%).  It is 
impossible to ignore the fact that the percentage of Republican-appointed 
judges corresponds almost identically to the 37% employer success rate in 
the Fourth Circuit. 
However, because some judges were active for much of the study 
period before taking senior status, it seemed prudent to weigh the 
percentage of Republican-appointed and Democrat-appointed judges who 
had been active for the majority of the study period.  The number of years 
each judge was active during the study interval was identified.  The total 
years of Democrat-appointed and Republican-appointed judges were 
calculated and then expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
judging years during the study interval.  Using this metric, 54% of judging 
years were accounted by Democrat-appointed judges and 46% 
Republican-appointed judges.  While it seems that the percentage of 
Republican-appointed judges is related to the employer success rate, it was 
not clear that it was a close correlation. 
Because of this, the study also tested this theory on the two other 
federal circuit courts in the study to see whether they supported any 
correlation between employer success rates and percentage of Republican-
appointed judges.  In the Eighth Circuit during the 2006–2018 interval, 
there were a total of five Democrat-appointed judges (20%) and nineteen 
Republican-appointed judges (80%).100  Excluding judges who took senior 
status, resigned, retired, or died between 2006–2018 results in one 
Democrat-appointed judge (10%) and nine Republican-appointed judges 
(90%).101  These figures may overrepresent Republican-appointed judges, 
                                                          
 98. The Democrat-appointed judges were: J. Harris, J. Thacker, J. Floyd, J. Diaz, J. Wynn, J. 
Keenan, J. Davis, J. King, J. Traxler, J. Motz, J. Michael, and J. Phillips.  The Republican-appointed 
judges were: J. Agee, J. Duncan, J. Shedd, J. Gregory, J. Williams, J. Luttig, J. Hamilton, J. Niemeyer, 
J. Wilkins, J. Wilkinson, J. Chapman, J. Widener, and J. Butzner.  A more accurate picture could be 
obtained by weighting the judges based on number of years during this interval that the judge was on 
active status.  This level of detail is simply beyond the scope of this Article. 
 99. The Fourth Circuit judges that resigned, retired, or died are: J. Davis, J. Shedd, J. Traxler, J. 
Michael, J. Williams, J. Luttig, J. Hamilton, J. Wilkins, J. Chapman, J. Phillips, J. Widener, and J. 
Butzner. 
 100. The Democrat-appointed judges were: J. Bright, J. Bye, J. Kelly, J. Lay, and J. Murphy.  The 
Republican-appointed judges were: J. Arnold, J. Beam, J. Benton, J. Bowman, J. Colloton, J. Erickson, 
J. Fagg, J. Gibson, J. Grasz, J. Gruender, J. Hansen, J. Loken, J. Melloy, J. Riley, J. Ross, J. Shepherd, 
J. Smith, J. Stras, and J. Wollman. 
 101. The Democrat-appointed judges who took senior status, resigned, retired, or died were: J. 
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however, because two Democrat-appointed judges took senior status fairly 
late in the study interval, in 2015 and 2016.102  Using the metric of 
percentage of years occupied by Democrat-appointed and Republican-
appointed judges in the study’s timeframe results in 23% Democrat-
appointed judging years and 77% Republican-appointed judging years.  In 
the Eighth Circuit, the employer success rate is very similar to the 
percentage of Republican-appointed judging years. 
In the Tenth Circuit during the study interval, there were a total of 
twelve Democrat-appointed judges (44%) and fifteen Republican-
appointed judges (56%).103  However, a substantial proportion of the 
Republican-appointed judges were in senior status or terminated their 
commissions during the study period.  Excluding these results in seven 
Democrat-appointed judges (64%) and four Republican-appointed judges 
(36%).104  This may overrepresent Democrat-appointed judges, though, 
because two Republican-appointed judges either terminated their 
commission or took senior status very late in the study, in 2017.105  Using 
the alternative metric, Democrat-appointed judges represented 41% of the 
total years of active judging during the study interval compared to 59% for 
Republican-appointed judges. 
Considering all of this together, the possibility that the differences 
between circuits are driven at least in part by the political affiliations of 
judges seems very plausible.  Here, there appears to be a connection 
between being Republican-appointed and ruling in favor of the employer.  
This is not surprising, given the generally pro-employer stance of the 
Republican Party.106  This research is suggestive, but not conclusive, 
                                                          
Bright, J. Bye, J. Lay, and J. Murphy.  The Republican-appointed judges who took senior status, 
resigned, retired, or died were: J. Arnold, J. Beam, J. Bowman, J. Fagg, J. Gibson, J. Hansen, J, Melloy, 
J. Riley, J. Ross, and J. Wollman. 
 102. The two Democrat-appointed judges who took senior status were J. Bye (2015) and J. Murphy 
(2016). 
 103. The Democrat-appointed judges were: J. Bacharach, J. Briscoe, J. Henry, J. Holloway, J. 
Lucero, J. Matheson, J. McHugh, J. McKay, J. Moritz, J. Murphy, J. Phillips, and J. Seymour.  The 
Republican-appointed judges were: J. Anderson, J. Baldock, J. Barrett, J. Brorby, J. Ebel, J. Eid, J. 
Gorsuch, J. Hartz, J. Holmes, J. Kelly, J. McWilliams, J. O’Brien, J. Porfilio, J. Tacha, and J. 
Tymkovich. 
 104. The Democrat-appointed judges who took senior status or terminated their commissions 
were: J. Henry, J. Holloway, J. McKay, J. Murphy, and J. Seymour.  The Republican-appointed judges 
who took senior status or terminated their commissions were: J. Baldock, J. Barrett, J. Brorby, J. Ebel, 
J. Gorsuch, J. Kelly, J. McWilliams, J. O’Brien, J. Porfilio, and J. Tacha. 
 105. The Republican-appointed judges who terminated their commission or took senior status in 
2017 were J. Gorsuch and J. Kelly. 
 106. See, e.g., Louis L. Chodoff et al., Expect Pro-Business, Pro-Employer Changes Under Trump 
Administration, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.ballardspahr.com/alerts 
publications/legalalerts/2017-01-20-expect-pro-business-pro-employer-changes-under-trump-
adminsitration [https://perma.cc/UNA2-F66U]. 
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because it did not assess the composition of the judicial panels reaching 
the decisions in the cases studied and did not test for statistical 
significance.107 
b. Sex and Race of the Judges in the Circuits 
Research in the immigration asylum context revealed that the sex of 
the deciding judge had a statistically significant effect on whether asylum 
was granted, with female judges granting more asylum claims than male 
judges.108  There is similar research on the effect of district court judges’ 
sex on the outcomes of employment discrimination cases.  Plaintiffs in 
cases tried before a female judge were more likely to be successful.109 
Examining the circuits in this study, the Eighth Circuit had the fewest 
female judges during the study period.  One was appointed in 2013, and a 
second was active from the beginning of the study period until 2016, when 
she took senior status.110  I weighted this in terms of years, adding the total 
number of years female judges were active in the Eighth Circuit as a 
percentage of the total of number of years of all active judges during the 
study period.  Female judges occupied 10% of total years of judging during 
the study period.  Using the same method in the Tenth Circuit resulted in 
18% female judging years, and in the Fourth Circuit, 26%.  While I did 
not conduct an analysis of statistical significance, the employer success 
rates are higher in the circuits with lower percentages of female judges. 
As for race, using data from the Federal Judicial Center,111 judges were 
coded for race by including all judges who had any race or ethnicity 
indicated in addition to or other than white.  They were then weighted for 
years of active judging in the same manner as sex and political affiliation.  
Using this metric, 28% of the active judging years were served by judges 
of color in the Fourth Circuit, 10% of the Tenth Circuit, and 8% of the 
Eighth Circuit.112  As with sex, the lower the percentage of active judging 
years by judges of color, the higher the employer’s success rates. 
In addition to considering sex and race separately, taking them 
                                                          
 107. The focus of this research project was on the outcomes of the Burlington Northern issue.  The 
results were surprising and there was simply inadequate time or funding to reach the level of detail 
that would link panel political composition with outcomes. 
 108. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 342. 
 109. Id. at 343 n.79 (summarizing various research studies that have analyzed the impact of a 
judge’s gender on the outcome of cases, specifically in employment discrimination cases). 
 110. J. Kelly was appointed in 2013, and J. Murphy took senior status in 2016. 
 111. See Biographical Directory, supra note 95. 
 112. The Fourth Circuit was served by J. Diaz, J. Wynn, J. Davis, J. Duncan, and J. Gregory.  The 
Tenth Circuit was served by J. Holmes and J. Lucero.  Finally, the Eighth Circuit was served by J. 
Smith. 
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together seemed fruitful because of the research indicating that both race 
and sex affect outcomes in employment discrimination cases.  Using this 
metric, in the Fourth Circuit, 46% of active judging years were by judges 
that were female and/or of color.  For the Eighth Circuit, it was 18%, and 
for the Tenth Circuit, it was 30%.  Table 5 provides a snapshot of this data 
along with the employer success rates for each circuit. 
TABLE 5: JUDICIAL DEMOGRAPHICS AND EMPLOYER SUCCESS RATES 





Fourth Circuit 26% 28% 46% 37% 
Eighth Circuit 10% 8% 18% 79% 
Tenth Circuit 18% 16% 30% 64% 
As is evident from Table 5, the percentage of active judging years of 
female/of color judges appears to be inversely related to employer success 
rates.  The higher the percentage of female/of color judges, the better the 
outcomes for employees.  However, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have 
nearly identical percentages of judges who are female and/or of color, yet 
the employer success rates are quite different in the two circuits.  
Furthermore, since I did not conduct a test of statistical significance, 
caution is warranted in considering the relationship between sex/race and 
outcomes. 
c. Circuits Retained Their Approach in Outcomes 
Looking beyond demographics and political affiliation, there was 
another plausible legal explanation for the result: that the circuits were 
retaining their pre-Burlington Northern approach to these cases.  While 
the courts were stating the legal standard from Burlington Northern, they 
were applying the standard in a way that was more aligned with their own 
circuit’s approach to the issue before Burlington Northern was decided.  It 
seemed possible that, in the aftermath of Burlington Northern, the lower 
courts were using the language of the new standard but applying it in a 
way that would be more consistent with the circuit’s approach pre-
Burlington Northern.  In other words, the federal courts might be 
articulating the standard according to the new Supreme Court case while 
still reaching results that would be more consistent with their circuit’s prior 
standard. 
This theory could explain the Eighth Circuit’s outcomes.  Before 
Burlington Northern, the Eighth Circuit required that the plaintiff suffer 
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an “adverse employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate 
employment decision.”113  This was one of the most restrictive, employer-
favorable approaches taken before Burlington Northern.  Thus, the 77% 
employer success rate in the Eighth Circuit might simply be the Eighth 
Circuit continuing to adhere to the types of outcomes it reached before 
Burlington Northern while articulating the Burlington Northern legal 
standard in its decisions. 
However, this theory is less compelling in explaining the outcomes in 
the Tenth and Fourth Circuits.  Before Burlington Northern, the Tenth 
Circuit had one of the more employee-favorable approaches to what 
constituted an actionable retaliation claim.114  In discussing its standard, 
one panel of the Tenth Circuit rejected the approach taken by the Eighth 
Circuit and noted that “[i]n recognition of the remedial nature of Title VII, 
the law in this circuit liberally defines adverse employment action.”115  
Thus, one would expect the Tenth Circuit to be employee favorable.  And, 
to a certain extent, one can see the Tenth Circuit as being employee 
favorable.  It is certainly more employee friendly than the Eighth Circuit 
on this issue.  However, it is not as employee favorable as the Fourth 
Circuit; and overall, employers are more likely to succeed on the 
Burlington Northern issue than employees in the Tenth Circuit.  In short, 
the evidence from the Tenth Circuit could be read to support or refute the 
possibility that federal courts are achieving their pre-Burlington Northern 
outcomes even after the change in legal standard. 
This leaves the Fourth Circuit.  Before Burlington Northern, the 
Fourth Circuit’s standard was among the most employer favorable in the 
country.116  Yet its outcomes since Burlington Northern are highly 
employee favorable.  Could this be because of the change in composition 
of the Fourth Circuit since Burlington Northern?  To test this, I divided 
the Fourth Circuit cases into two groups: one for the first period after 
Burlington Northern was decided in 2006, through 2011, and a second 
group for 2011 through 2018.  In the earlier timeframe, the employer 
prevailed in 36% of the cases.  For the period from 2012 to 2018, that 
increased by 2%, with the employer prevailing 38% of the time.  This 
relatively minor increase does not support the hypothesis that the 
composition of the Fourth Circuit changed after Burlington Northern in a 
way that affected the rates of employer success. 
                                                          
 113. Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Burlington 
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 114. See, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 115. Id. (quoting Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated by McInnis 
v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129 (2006)).  
 116. See supra Part I. 
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Perhaps, instead, there was a change in the Fourth Circuit before 
Burlington Northern.  It is possible that some of the judges of the Fourth 
Circuit were unhappy with the pre-Burlington Northern standard but 
bound by circuit precedent.  After the new standard was articulated in 
Burlington Northern, judges were able to decide cases in favor of 
employees that were not possible under the pre-Burlington Northern 
standard in the Fourth Circuit.117 
Overall, given that only the Eighth Circuit’s outcomes are obviously 
explainable under this theory, it is not a satisfactory explanation of the 
circuit split. 
d. Fourth Circuit as an Outlier 
It was suggested118 that the Fourth Circuit might be an outlier because 
so many employment cases in that circuit involve the United States 
Government as the employer-defendant.  If cases involving the 
government as employer are excluded from the Fourth Circuit cases, the 
success rate of employers rises by one percent, to 38%.  This does not 
appear to be a driver of the employer success rate in the Fourth Circuit. 
e. Circuit Hostility to Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Yet another possible explanation is that the outcomes are driven by 
the degree to which each circuit is hostile to employment discrimination 
plaintiffs.  Professors Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab suggested this 
as a possible reason for the sharper decline in employment discrimination 
cases filed in some federal circuits than in others.119  However, scholars 
suggest that the Fourth Circuit is hostile toward employment 
discrimination plaintiffs,120 and this is inconsistent with what was found in 
                                                          
 117. Another possibility to explain the circuit split is that the Fourth Circuit’s own reputation for 
being pro-employer created a pool of cases that differs from other circuits.  One could posit that 
plaintiff’s attorneys in the Fourth Circuit are incentivized to bring fewer cases that are close calls, 
resulting in a higher rate of plaintiff victories over time.  However, the same argument could be made 
for the Eighth Circuit with its tougher stance on retaliation claims. 
 118. Professor Margaret Johnson made this interesting suggestion when I presented preliminary 
findings to the faculty of the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
 119. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 48, at 119 (noting “the steepest decline in case terminations 
comes in the Eleventh Circuit, with the Fifth, Fourth, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits following.  Those 
circuits correspond well with those a plaintiffs’ lawyer previously described as circuits perceived by 
the bar to be the most hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs”). 
 120. Id; see also Empirical Studies: How Do Discrimination Cases Fare in Court? Proceedings 
of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Employment 
Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 533, 542 (2003) (discussing the hostility of the Fourth 
Circuit to plaintiffs in ADA cases).  However, the number of Democrat-appointed judges in the Fourth 
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this study.  Research has also shown the hostility of the Fourth Circuit 
toward asylum seekers,121 which one would predict would be more likely 
to suggest an employer-favorable outcome here, which was not the case. 
3. Better Employee Outcomes in Reported Cases 
Overall, employees fared marginally better in reported cases than in 
unreported cases within each circuit.  In the Fourth Circuit, the employer 
success rate was 6% lower in reported cases than in unreported cases.  In 
the Eighth Circuit, the employer success rate was 21% lower in reported 
cases, and in the Tenth Circuit, it was 25%.  It may be that reported cases, 
by their nature, are given greater attention by the judges, and this greater 
attention leads to better outcomes for employees.  This is consistent with 
Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod’s research on motivations of state 
court judges.122  In that research study, Ash and MacLeod found that 
“judges prefer working on important cases that can influence the law in 
the future.”123  By their nature, unreported cases are of limited precedential 
value, with concomitant limited influence on the development of the law. 
Another possibility is that plaintiffs are more likely to be represented 
in court in reported cases as contrasted with unreported cases.  In research 
involving immigration cases, the single largest factor affecting outcomes 
of the cases was whether the immigrant was represented.124  Thus, a lack 
of representation by employees may be influencing the higher rates of 
employer success in unreported cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The 60% employer success rate found in this research is a metric that 
can support competing theories.  On the one hand, it indicates that 
employers are prevailing in the majority of situations where the Burlington 
Northern issue is addressed.  On the other hand, it indicates that employers 
are prevailing at significantly lower rates on this issue than in employment 
discrimination cases in general, which suggests that on this issue at least, 
the federal appellate courts are not as hostile to plaintiffs as in other Title 
VII contexts. 
                                                          
Circuit during the study period suggests that the Fourth Circuit has moved away from its status as one 
of the most conservative circuits in the country. 
 121. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 363. 
 122. See generally Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: 
Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts, 58 J.L. & ECON. 863 (2015). 
 123. Id. at 865. 
 124. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 78, at 340.  
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Perhaps more importantly, the hidden circuit split revealed in this 
study raises important questions about the expectations we have for the 
application of uniform legal standards across the country and the reasons 
for different outcomes in different circuits.  Exploration of other contexts 
in which this is occurring would contribute to our understanding of the 
extent to which this is a common occurrence, whether it is significant, and 
whether steps need to be taken to limit the frequency of these hidden 
circuit splits. 
